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William Poole
I
am pleased to be here to address this session
of the annual meeting of the Southern Legis-
lative Conference. Since becoming president
of the St. Louis Fed, I’ve gotten to know pretty
well a good part of the 16-state region that com-
prises the Southern Conference. The Eighth Federal
Reserve District, headquartered in St. Louis and with
branches in Little Rock, Memphis, and Louisville,
includes all of Arkansas and parts of Kentucky,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Missouri. (The Eighth
Federal Reserve District also includes the southern
portions of Illinois and Indiana.) I’ve traveled exten-
sively in this region, meeting bankers, business
leaders, community and university leaders, and
elected officials at all levels of government. This is a
region full of vitality and, I might add as an easterner
for most of my life, delightful southern hospitality.
My charge today is to discuss the condition of
the national and SLC state economies. There are
always many elements to analyzing the economy;
I’ve decided to concentrate on the aspect of the
current environment that seems most troubling—
the condition of the equity markets.
Two hundred and fifty years ago it was estab-
lished wisdom that the measure of a nation’s material
wealth was the size of its stock of gold. Adam Smith,
in his great book, The Wealth of Nations, published
in 1776, argued that this view was dead wrong—
that the true measure was the nation’s output. Today,
all too often, people make a similar mistake as
they judge a nation’s wealth by the level of its stock
market. Gold was important in Smith’s day, as is the
stock market in our day, but not for the reasons
incorporated in the established wisdom. 
My purpose today is twofold—to provide some
perspective on how the stock market matters and
to discuss possible approaches to creating greater
financial stability.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that the
views I express here are mine and do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, especially Robert Rasche and
William Emmons, for their comments, but I retain
full responsibility for errors.
GOODS AND CLAIMS ON GOODS
One of Smith’s essential insights, as true today
as in 1776, was that gold had to be viewed as a claim
on goods. The reason that people valued gold was
that it could be used to buy goods they wanted—
food, clothing, shelter, land, and anything else avail-
able in the marketplace. From the perspective of
any one individual, gold provided command over
goods and therefore was a component of the individ-
ual’s wealth. But from the perspective of all individ-
uals taken together—the entire nation—command
over goods depended on the supply of goods. A
nation cannot, except temporarily, consume goods
beyond what it produces. For a nation as a whole
to enjoy a high material standard of living—to have
a large command over goods—it had to produce a
lot of goods. Thus Smith argued that the wealth of
a nation depends on the productivity of its people,
which permits it to produce a high level of output
from the hours of labor devoted to production.
Nothing has changed in this regard from Smith’s
day. The stock market wealth of three years ago
provided each person holding a share of that wealth
with a command over goods that seemed, and in
the aggregate was, large. It was not possible, however,
for all individuals together to cash in that wealth;
for all individuals together, the goods that people
could buy were limited to the goods the economy
could produce. Given that we live in a global econ-
omy, we can apply that statement to all the world’s
citizens taken together. 
BUYERS AND SELLERS
Before I discuss the role of the stock market in
the economy I have to get an issue out of the way—
the simple fact that every share of stock sold is also
one purchased. Stock market analysts who explain
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investors getting into or out of the market are not
making good sense. Investors as a whole cannot
get into or out of the market. An effort of investors to
get out of the market depresses stock prices suffi-
ciently that other investors are persuaded to buy.
Of course, the number of shares of stock outstanding
does change over time through bankruptcies, com-
pany share repurchases that retire stock, and new
issues that add to the total outstanding. These factors
are of trivial importance for the number of shares
outstanding day by day.
Because shares sold equals shares purchased,
all investors taken together cannot convert claims
on wealth into goods. If one investor sells stock for
the purpose of using the proceeds to buy, say, a new
car, then some other investor must forego spending
on goods in order to buy the shares that the first
investor is selling. The effect of share prices on the
economy is necessarily indirect.
Economists emphasize two mechanisms through
which share prices affect the economy. One is that
in a rising market companies can more easily raise
funds to devote to building new factories or buying
new capital equipment. Thus the level of stock prices
affects the cost of capital, which in turn affects the
rate of business investment in physical capital. A
second mechanism is the effect of wealth on house-
hold consumption. When wealth is high, households
tend to spend more of their current income, because
they see less need to save for the future. When wealth
declines, households tend to consume less and to
save more. Thus the level of the stock market can
affect households’ demand for cars, TVs, vacation
travel, and all the other things people spend their
income on. It is important, however, to think about
the wealth effect in terms of total household wealth,
which includes the value of bonds and real estate as
well as common stock. Finally, the evidence suggests
that the wealth effect is spread out over time and is
small relative to the effect of household income.
In the short run, stock market fluctuations are
far, far larger than fluctuations in the nation’s pro-
duction, which we measure by the inflation-adjusted
gross domestic product (GDP). For example, over
the four quarters ending with the second quarter
of this year, real GDP rose by 2.1 percent. Over the
same period, the S&P 500 stock index was down
16 percent. Relative to the stock market, real GDP
is so steady that we can for many purposes think
of GDP as being fixed in the short run. 
Given that GDP is very steady compared with the
stock market, the behavior of stock prices primarily
affects who gets how much of GDP rather than the
total of GDP itself in the short run. If you are lucky
enough to sell stock at the peak, you get more; if you
are unfortunate enough to sell at the bottom, you get
less. In either case, the buyer of the shares you sell
is getting either less or more, the necessary mirror
image of what you are getting through the accident
of your timing of stock sales. 
This redistribution of who gets what sometimes
makes people angry, and they have good reason to
be angry if the redistribution reflects market manip-
ulation of some sort. This is one of the reasons that
reforms to reduce the likelihood of market manipu-
lation effected through accounting fraud and other
means is so important. But I do want to point out
that much of the redistribution between stock market
winners and losers reflects outcomes that are some-
what similar to those of a lottery. No one is forced
to buy a lottery ticket, and those who do should not
believe that the redistribution of wealth from lottery
losers to lottery winners is unfair in any respect,
provided that the selection of the winners is not
manipulated in any way. 
Every serious student of the stock market knows
that the track record of presumed expert stock
pickers is not consistently better than pure random
stock selection. I’m not looking to drum up hundreds
of angry e-mail messages from investment profes-
sionals, and so let me add that I believe that invest-
ment professionals have a lot to offer. It is just that
their clients should not believe that their investment
services include reliable strategies to consistently
pick stocks that will outperform the overall market
and consistently identify the right times to buy and
sell.
WHY THE STOCK MARKET MATTERS
When Adam Smith argued that gold was not
the right measure of a nation’s wealth, he was not
saying that gold was irrelevant to a nation’s pros-
perity. In his day, the monetary system was based on
gold, and monetary instability clearly had negative
effects on the economy. Today, the monetary system
is not based on gold, and for this reason gold has
little macroeconomic significance. The stock market,
though not itself an adequate measure of a nation’s
wealth, has great importance. The market’s effect
on business investment and household spending
on consumption goods is only part of the story.
Let me zero in on a matter of great concern to
many families today. In recent years millions of
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stock market. Those who placed a high fraction of
their assets in certain stocks have seen their retire-
ment dreams and their financial security disappear
in the bear market underway since early 2000. 
Those stock market losses could not have
occurred if the market did not exhibit such large
fluctuations. Suppose, hypothetically, that stock
prices grew consistently along a smooth path. Take
a stock market chart from 1950 to today and draw
a smooth line between the starting and ending points.
If stock prices grew smoothly along such a path, all
the promise of rapid gains would be absent, as would
all the anguish of having asset values disappear. Each
stock market investor would have a high degree of
certainty about his or her financial condition during
retirement years. 
Would investors in fact confine themselves to
such stable and predictable investments? I suspect
not. Indeed, I am quite certain that many would
pursue strategies they believed would yield higher
returns. After all, investors who went heavily into
the stock market several years ago did have alterna-
tives that were highly stable and predictable, such
as government bonds, and they chose not to confine
themselves to those safe havens. So I’m not sure
that creating a stable stock market, if we knew how
to do it, would be successful in stabilizing the retire-
ment prospects of many people.
If the stock market does not measure the nation’s
wealth, what does it measure and why does it fluc-
tuate so much? The price of a company’s stock
reflects market expectations about the future earn-
ings of the company—the stock price is the present
discounted value of the expected future income
stream. For all companies taken together, those
expectations therefore concern the country’s future
output and not its current output. Expectations are
changeable because the future is uncertain and
because they may be influenced by waves of opti-
mism or pessimism. Those expectations do affect
current household and business behavior, but they
are far from the only determinants.
Some decry what they see as the irrational
fluctuations in the stock market reflecting, they
believe, expectations that get carried away on the
upside or downside. I myself do not believe that it
is at all easy to identify expectations that are irra-
tional. We live in a nation that is generally exuberant
about future possibilities. To my taste, we are fortu-
nate to live in a society that nurtures invention. Our
risk-taking mentality has two sides to it. On the
one hand is the entrepreneurial spirit that develops
new technologies and brings them to market. Many
of these new technologies create astonishing
improvements in our material standard of living.
On the other hand is a gambling mentality that is
sometimes foolish. Ahead of time, it is rarely easy
to tell which bets on new businesses will work and
which will not.
The importance of the stock market for the
long-run performance of the economy is consider-
able. The longer the span of years considered, the
less accurate is the assumption that GDP is roughly
constant, unaffected by the behavior of the stock
market. The rate of growth of GDP depends critically
on the rate of productivity growth—the growth of
output per hour of labor input. Productivity growth
flows from innovation and entrepreneurship. A pro-
ductivity growth rate of 1.5 percent per year, about
what was achieved from 1968 to 1995, increases per
capita GDP by 16 percent after 10 years. Since 1995,
productivity growth has been about 2.5 percent per
year. That rate of productivity growth increases per
capita GDP by 28 percent in 10 years. There is a big
difference between 16 percent and 28 percent GDP
growth over the course of a decade.
Productivity growth depends on many things:
One of those things is the efficiency with which
the economy allocates investment, which in turn
depends in part on the stock market. It can be argued
that the booming stock market in the late 1990s
permitted telecom companies to finance investments
in computer equipment and fiber optic cable that
were wasteful in the sense that this capital, even
today, several years after being put in place, is not
generating output and income. We would have had
higher current output if the investment had gone in
some other direction. From the standpoint of this
particular story, the economy’s productivity was
damaged and not enhanced by the stock market
boom in telecom shares. But the telecom mistake
was not obvious at the time it occurred. If it had
been completely obvious, it would not have hap-
pened. Investment mistakes are an inevitable part
of a dynamic economy. We want a stock market
that is receptive to new enterprises and does the
best job possible in sending capital toward the most
promising endeavors. 
PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE
FINANCIAL STABILITY
There is no realistic prospect of devising public
policies that will yield stock prices that are always
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2002      3
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Poole“right.” The future is always uncertain. New tech-
nologies are inherently experimental—some will
work and others will not. From a broader perspective,
the new enterprises that fail are not signs of societal
failure. A business community that never fails is one
that never tries.
Still, we certainly want to avoid public policies
that permit, or encourage, avoidable mistakes. The
current debate over accounting principles is very
healthy. Penalties for fraudulent accounting and
increased enforcement efforts will yield substan-
tial societal benefits. I say “societal” and not just
“economic” because a market economy that is fair,
and widely perceived as fair, has benefits far beyond
a higher material standard of living.
We will come out the other side of our current
experience with accounting irregularities in a much
stronger position than we entered it. Corporate
boards, senior management, and audit firms will
not take risks on accounting issues lightly. The com-
bination of government action and market discipline
has brought some prominent and long-established
firms down quickly, and everyone involved in cor-
porate governance will remember these events for
a long time. The fate of Arthur Andersen, Enron,
WorldCom, and other firms illustrates that the
United States does have mechanisms—both govern-
mental and market-based—to impose lasting econ-
omic reforms. Consider some other examples. 
Bank failures in the 1930s led to deposit insur-
ance. That reform contributed greatly to improved
banking stability, but it turned out to have a flaw. The
consequence of an inadequate regulatory system
was the failure of the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, as scores of insured savings
and loan associations failed. To make good on the
deposit insurance guarantee, the cost to the tax-
payers in the early 1990s was in the neighborhood
of $150 billion. But we learned a lesson. Regulatory
requirements were strengthened; the most important
of these, in my opinion, was much more rigorous
enforcement of capital requirements for insured
depository institutions. 
We should not underestimate the contribution
of this reform for improving financial stability.
Failures of depository institutions in the late 1980s
and early 1990s restricted the availability of credit
to many borrowers, especially those that had tradi-
tionally relied on banks and S&Ls. The credit restric-
tion was one of the reasons the economy recovered
slowly from the 1990-91 recession. In contrast, last
year’s recession was relatively mild in part because
the banking system was stable and able to lend to
reasonable business risks. The stability of the bank-
ing system certainly helped the economy cope with
recession.
One more example, though a smaller one: When
the Penn-Central Railroad declared bankruptcy in
1970, the commercial paper market was disrupted
as investors wondered what other firms were also
suspect. The suspicion was in many ways a small-
scale version of what we are seeing today. Until
June 1, Penn-Central commercial paper was rated
highly, and the company’s bankruptcy on June 21
was a shock. Investors refused to roll over commer-
cial paper of many highly rated companies because
they were no longer sure what the ratings meant.
Since that experience, companies have routinely
arranged back-up lines of credit at banks, which they
can rely on should the commercial paper market
turn unreceptive. That change in business practice
prevented any recurrence of the generalized dis-
ruption of the commercial paper market that we
witnessed in 1970.
LOOKING AHEAD
It is easy today to look back and wish that some-
body, somehow, had done more to improve account-
ing and audit practice. Similarly, it was easy to look
back in 1990 and wish that somebody, somehow,
had done more to strengthen regulation of S&Ls, to
prevent the loss of $150 billion of taxpayer funds.
What can we do right now to look ahead, to see what
vulnerabilities we might face, and to do something
in advance to ensure that some new source of
financial instability does not bite us?
Periods of great market instability arise when
three conditions are met. First, something happens
that has widespread significance—is large enough
to matter to lots of people. Second, the triggering
event is a surprise; ordinarily, events long anticipated
are not a problem because corrective action occurs
before problems arise. Third, substantial uncertainty
clouds resolution of the problem. It is especially
difficult for investors to know what to do when the
government’s response to an unfolding situation is
highly uncertain. 
Let me propose two vulnerabilities we face that
really need to be examined carefully. One is familiar
to everyone—the state of the Social Security and
Medicare systems. The issue certainly meets two of
my three criteria. The potential problem is huge and
there is great uncertainty about what the government
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in one sense, it could quickly turn into one. The
fact is that a change in economic conditions could
quickly increase the estimated size of the problem
and move forward the time when the problem would
become acute. 
If the nation finds itself in a period of financial
instability because of an unexpected and rapid
escalation of the financial problems faced by Social
Security and Medicare, we will look back and wonder
why, with the vulnerability known for so long, noth-
ing was done to reduce it. The nation has time to
act, but disagreement on what should be done has
led to a stalemate. Maintaining financial stability
requires a willingness to find some way to engineer
a compromise to reduce the nation’s vulnerability
that a financial crisis will some day flow from Social
Security and Medicare.
The second vulnerability I would like to see more
widely discussed concerns government-sponsored
enterprises, or GSEs. The GSEs include Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Bank System,
and a number of smaller entities. The GSEs meet
all three of my criteria for the potential of creating
financial instability.
First, the GSEs are certainly large. In the United
States today, GSE securities and government-related
mortgage pool securities outstanding, excluding
deposits, exceed the total outstanding securities
issued by all—I repeat, all—other private financial
sector firms taken together. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac alone, as of last December 31, had securities
outstanding of $1.3 trillion and had guaranteed
another $1.8 trillion of mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). Looked at another way, the total of GSE direct
and guaranteed debt is 40 percent larger than the
federal government’s debt. That debt, which we
loosely call the “national debt,” has, of course, been
a matter of considerable discussion in recent years
in the debates about federal deficits and surpluses. 
Second, although financial experts understand
the vulnerability, my judgment is that too few in the
markets and in government understand the issues.
Consequently, if there is ever a problem, it will take
many by surprise.
Third, there is tremendous ambiguity about the
status of the GSEs. The market prices GSE debt as if
there is a federal guarantee, or a high probability of
a guarantee, standing behind the debt. Yet, there is
no explicit guarantee in the law. 
No one should underestimate the potential
importance of the ambiguity over the financial status
of the GSEs. It is not sufficient for any single GSE to
argue that its own financial condition is sound. If
one GSE comes under a cloud, others may also.
That has been our experience again and again. It is
the process economists call “contagion” whereby
uninvolved or innocent firms are affected because
the market has difficulty distinguishing solid firms
from those at risk. 
Perhaps the most famous example of contagion
in U.S history is the series of bank runs in the early
1930s. Good and bad banks alike were affected.
For another example, in 1970 the Penn-Central
bankruptcy affected the entire commercial paper
market, as investors did not know which commercial
paper issuers were in fact prime credits and which,
though rated prime, were not. This year, accounting
problems identified in a few firms have raised ques-
tions in investors’ minds about almost all firms. We
may believe that only one firm in twenty, or in fifty,
has suspect accounts, but how do we know which
firms? We don’t, and therefore investors treat all
firms as suspect until the accounting treatments
are verified. When there is an issue of this kind, it
takes a while to get everything sorted out; in the
meantime, securities prices are pushed down. 
In the case of the GSEs, the massive scale of
their liabilities could create a massive problem in
the credit markets. If the market value of GSE debt
were to fall sharply, because of ambiguity about the
financial soundness of GSEs and about the willing-
ness of the federal government to backstop the debt,
what would happen? I do not know, and neither
does anyone else. 
Like Social Security, there are different views
on what, if anything, should be done about the GSEs.
In the meantime, the prevailing view seems to be
that a GSE debt meltdown could not occur, or could
not occur soon. I do not see any immediate risk of
a GSE debt problem, but am not willing to assume
that in different conditions in the future one could
not occur. A judgment that there is no potential
vulnerability seems to me to be unwarranted in
light of the financial history of the United States
and other countries. One thing I know for sure is
that if the problem becomes immediate and real,
then dealing with it will be very difficult because
the urgency will be so great.
Let me throw out for debate two steps the federal
government might take. First, various aspects of
federal sponsorship that the market interprets as
providing an implied guarantee of GSE debt should
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the authority to buy GSE obligations; in the case of
Fannie and Freddie, the authority is up to a maximum
of $2.25 billion for each firm. The GSEs could easily
replace this potential source of emergency financial
support with credit lines at commercial banks, fol-
lowing the widespread practice among issuers of
commercial paper. The amount available at the dis-
cretion of the Secretary of the Treasury is far too
small in any event to deal with a crisis in the GSE
debt market. Eliminating the Treasury’s authority
to lend to the GSEs would provide a signal that the
government is serious when it says that there is no
government guarantee of GSE debt. Second, over a
transitional period of several years, the GSEs should
add to the amount of capital they hold.
Capital is critical because, when there is a crisis
in the securities markets, financially strong firms
can stand the pressure without lasting damage.
Capital provides a cushion against mistakes and
unforeseeable circumstances. With adequate capital,
a firm can almost always raise emergency loans to
cover its liquidity problems.
The importance of adequate capital became
clear to policymakers as the S&L problems accumu-
lated in the late 1980s. Tightening of capital standards
for insured depository institutions and the adminis-
tration of those requirements was a key part of the
reforms put in place at that time. 
Capital is important for the GSEs because their
short-term obligations are large. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have debt obligations due within one
year of about 45 percent of their debt liabilities. Any
problem in the capital markets affecting these firms
could become very large very quickly.
Capital on the books of Fannie and Freddie is
well below the levels required of regulated depository
institutions. Let me quote a paragraph from the 2001
Annual Report of Fannie Mae, the largest single GSE.
During 2001, Fannie Mae issued $5 billion of
subordinated debt that received a rating of
AA from Standard & Poor’s and Aa2 from
Moody’s Investors Service. Fannie Mae’s sub-
ordinated debt serves as a supplement to
Fannie Mae’s equity capital, although it is
not a component of core capital. It provides
a risk-absorbing layer to supplement core
capital for the benefit of senior debt holders
and serves as a consistent and early market
signal of credit risk for investors. By the end
of 2003, Fannie Mae intends to issue suffi-
cient subordinated debt to bring the sum of
total capital and outstanding subordinated
debt to at least 4 percent of on-balance sheet
assets, after providing adequate capital to
support off-balance sheet MBS. Total capital
and outstanding subordinated debt repre-
sented 3.4 percent of on-balance sheet
assets at December 31, 2001. (pp. 44-45)
The capital situation at Freddie Mac is about the
same as the one at Fannie Mae. The capital adequacy
standards applying to these two GSEs were estab-
lished by the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial
Safety and Soundness Act of 1992. The core capital
requirement is 2.5 percent of on-balance sheet assets
and 0.45 percent of outstanding mortgage-backed
securities and other off-balance sheet obligations.
The off-balance sheet obligations have a capital
requirement because they are guaranteed by Fannie
and Freddie.
In the private sector, government securities
dealers carry capital in the neighborhood of 5 per-
cent, and other financial firms considerably more.
For example, FDIC-insured commercial banks hold
equity capital and subordinated debt of nearly 11
percent of total assets. 
The issue with Fannie and Freddie is not one of
disclosure. Their annual reports disclose quite well
the high degree of complexity of their operations,
and the small amount of capital they carry over that
required by law. My questions are these: Given the
complexity of their operations, is the capital standard
in the law adequate? Why is the standard so far
below that required of federally regulated banks?
What will happen to the housing market if Fannie
and Freddie become unstable?
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1 Farmer Mac, another GSE, was much in the news in recent months.
An article in the New York Times noted that one of the advantages
conferred by government sponsorship is “the ability to borrow almost
as cheaply as the government does because of a perception of govern-
ment backing that emanates from a single section in its charter. That
provision allows the Treasury, in certain circumstances, to provide up
to $1.5 billion in loans to Farmer Mac to support the guarantees the
company extends on farm loans” (9 June 2002, p. 8, col. 1).
An earlier article in the New York Times said the following: “The
boldface disclaimers [on GSE debt offerings] state that the securities
are not guaranteed by and do not constitute debts or obligations of
the United States government. But the warnings are roundly dismissed
by the analysts who follow the issuers’ stocks, the agencies that rate
their senior debt and the money managers who put their commercial
paper in money market funds. In interview after interview, market
professionals said that even if the paper did not carry an overt govern-
ment guarantee, there was an implied guarantee, which was just as
good, and the government would not allow weakness in the securities
to wreak havoc. That market confidence is evident in the low interest
rates that the organizations have to pay investors for financing, often
only half a percentage point more than what the United States Treasury
pays” (21 May 2002, p. 1, col. 5).I’ve been emphasizing the importance of
strengthening public policy to address potential
problems. Let me add one further item to be con-
sidered—whether federal tax law should continue
to encourage substitution of corporate debt for equity. 
In calculating income subject to tax, corporations
can deduct interest paid but not dividends paid. That
provision encourages corporations to issue debt
instead of equity to finance expansion and acquisi-
tions. Firms sometimes issue debt and use the pro-
ceeds to retire equity. Many corporations today pay
little or no dividends at all, preferring to provide a
return to shareholders through expected capital
gains on the shares, which are taxed at a lower rate
than dividends in the personal income tax. 
There is no doubt that a high level of debt
increases the risk of financial instability. Firms fail
when they cannot pay their bills. When a large frac-
tion of revenue is devoted to paying interest instead
of dividends, firms are more vulnerable to failure
when revenues fall. A dividend can be cut or elimi-
nated; interest payments cannot. Does it make good
sense to maintain a feature of the tax law that makes
the economy more vulnerable to financial instability?
The tax law could be changed in a revenue-neutral
way to eliminate this problem. I think we should
do so.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The decline in the stock market since early 2000,
and especially this summer, has been painful. We
should not, however, think of the stock market as a
direct measure of the nation’s wealth. All you have
to do is look at charts side by side of the stock market
and GDP to realize that there is a long history of
stock market fluctuations that are far larger than
GDP fluctuations; moreover, the two are not all that
highly correlated. I am not trying to tell you that
the stock market does not matter, but I am trying to
put the matter in proper perspective. From what we
know, it is reasonable to expect that the economic
recovery will continue and that the stock market
will in time settle down.
This experience should make us think about
what public policies could help to reduce the sever-
ity of market instability in the future. Reforms to
accounting and corporate governance now being
put in place are constructive. I’ve suggested some
other things we should look at, particularly the Social
Security and Medicare systems, the GSEs, and the
corporate tax law. My list is not meant to be exhaus-
tive, but surely has enough items for one speech. If
any of these areas come back to bite us in the future,
we’ll know that the enemy is us.
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